#83 La economia argentina se hundió gracias a las recetas liberales del FMI, infórmate.
De la wikipedia:
Comienzo de la crisis:
In 1991, under the rule of Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo, the Argentine peso's monetary value was fixed by law to the value of the United States dollar. The law (Ley de Convertibilidad) stated that any citizen could go to a bank and ask for any amount of cash in pesos to be converted to an equal amount of dollars; in order to secure this "convertibility", the Central Bank was bound to keep its dollar reserves at the same level as the cash in circulation.
Cénit de la crisis:
By 1998, newly elected President Fernando de la Rúa faced a country where unemployment had risen to a critical point, and the undesirable effects of the fixed exchange rate were showing forcefully. In 1999 Argentina's GDP dropped 4% and the country entered a recession (which was to last three years, ending in a collapse). Stability became stagnation (even deflation at times), and the economic measures taken did nothing to avert it; in fact, the government continued the contractive economic policies of its predecessor. The possible solution (abandonment of the exchange peg, with a voluntary devaluation of the peso) was considered a political suicide and a recipe for economic disaster. By the end of the century, complementary currencies such as the LECOP and the Patacón (bonds issued by the national and provincial states) emerged due to the shortage of cash.
Fin de la crisis:
The economic outlook was completely different from that of the 1990s; the high exchange rate made Argentine exports cheap and competitive abroad, while discouraging imports. In addition, the high price of soy in the international market produced an injection of massive amounts of foreign currency (with China becoming a major buyer of Argentina's soy products).
Ahora es cuando vienes y pones dónde ha recomendado el FMI igualar el valor de una moneda al de otra por ley.